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THE JURISTIC PERSON.-I.
It was probably a mathematician that first conceived
the plan of feigning an unreality as a convenient step in the
formation of an hypothesis, and then, having established his
theory, conveniently let his fiction disappear. The law has
been playing with such a fiction for centuries, in the course
of which, the fiction, instead of disappearing, as it so
conveniently does for the mathematician, has increased in
girth and height, and has maintained its ghostly existence,
in the face of the anathema of the philosopher and the fiat
of the judicial decree. In an evil day the law, like the
hospitable Arab, who permitted his camel to shelter his head
within-the domestic tent, gave shelter to an imaginary per-
son-the persona ficta,-then an infant, seemingly of little
promise and of precarious tenure of life. It has repaid the
hospitality of the law, even as the camel rewarded his
master-by making the legal household permanently un-
comfortable. The law, awakening to the peril of housing
so sturdy an unreality, has smiled uneasily, and said, "You
are but a fiction-you do not exist, really," and then, ap-
parently on the principle of Christian Science, has tried
to ignore its existence. But the persona ficta will not be
ignored. He is a corporation, a collective person, a legal
fiction, a convenient factor in legal reasoning, but, real
(31)
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or fictitious, he emerges uncannily from every fiat of ex-
tinction, much after the fashion of Antaeus who, cast to
earth, renewed his vitality.
The corporation too, person or not, has attributes, for we
know them as good and bad-they too, are sheep and
goats. When they are wronged they set the machinery of
the criminal law in motion-when they do wrong, the law is
puzzled to find a fiction responsible for a crime, in which, it
seems, the actor is not the only one whose hands show
traces of guilt. Here, we might think, the law could well
end the ghostly fiction by destroying it. But, neither the law
nor we have yet arrived there.
Much of the learning that has been built up about the
terms "legal fictions," "fictitious persons," "entities," "arti-
ficial being" has become cant. A vague connotation belongs
to each of these terms which enables the casual user of it to
apply it to the correct problem; of the consequences of the
application he is ignorant, and there is little or no relation
between theory and practice. The most uninformed mind
has an idea of capacities, and can even follow the ramifica-
tions by which a man by marrying his first cousin, loses some
of his second cousins, or becomes second cousin to his own
children, but the separation of individual wills from col-
lective wills is a task which even the academic mind has but
unsatisfactorily accomplished. Let us see what is here in-
volved. Dobson, Hobson, Jopson and others form a cor-
poration. Each receives stock, Dobson is president, and
Hobson secretary. They have a board of directors and own
property. Now who owns the property? Dobson, Jopson,
et at., or the vague personality connotated by the term cor-
poration. Is it, in fact, a personality? Dobson and the rest
own stock, ergo, no property. The directors do not own it;
all the stockholders together cannot alienate it, the corpora-
tion can. And the corporation is the sum of the volitions
of all the stockholders expressed in unity of action. It is
this individual, this aggregate of wills that has aroused all
the controversy. What name shall we give it? Person, col-
lective property-persona ficta-the name is very nearly a
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matter of indifference so long as we understand by it an ex-
istence distinct from the members that compose it; for, be it
understood, one may be a member of this corporate body
and yet deal with it-may sell to it-buy from it,-in fact,
maintain business relations with it, precisely as he does
with any other natural person.
The matter begins with dogma; men, in law and in phi-
losophy are natural persons. This might be taken to imply
that there are also persons of another sort. And that is a
fact. They are artificial persons or corporations, and they
exist because associations of large groups of men can con-
duct enterprises impossible to any member of the group as
an individual. It has been hinted -that it is a matter of
moment to determine what kind of body it is that results
from the combination. Is it an individual or can you still
recognize in it A, B, C, and D, of whom it is composed?
Many things can be effected by corporations, impossible to
individuals. Many things are so peculiarly individualistic in
their natures that they are impossible to corporations. They
cannot practise law and I suppose they would not be per-
mitted to preach sermons, although many think a syndicate
that attended to the writing of sermons might do some good.
And of course, they cannot enter into family relations, mar-
riage and the like.
It was said by an eminent authority that when a body of
twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred thousand men
bind themselves together to act in a particular way for some
common purpose, they create a body, which by no fiction
of law, but by the very nature of things, differs from the
individuals of whom it is constituted.1
Now the state is a body of this kind, and beginning with
the state and coming down by successive gradations, we en-
counter by the way, the subordinate state, which, if auton-
omous, is the next body of this sort, the self governing
county, district, or department; finally the municipal corpor-
ations such as cities, boroughs or townships. We have very
1The Trade and Combination Laws, A. V. Dicey, 17 Harvard Law
Review, 513.
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little difficulty in recognizing that when the state acts, it is
a different matter from the action of any member or citi-
zen of the state. If the state owe money, it is not owing
by the citizens; nor if half the citizens emigrated would
anyone think of following them to collect from each, his
proportion of the debt.
It is not a conception that the rationalistic mind finds
easy. Anaylsis seems to indicate that Hobson, Jopson, et
al. are masquerading under an alias and that this entity,
juristic person, or what you will, is simply Hobson, Jopson
and the company. Yet a suspicion is felt that when we
undertake to deal with this same persona ficta, we find in it
Hobson, Jopson, et al., plus something more-plus the cor-
poration. And for this plus some formula must be devised.
In the jargon of the schoolmen, corporations must be
"persons" or "not-persons;" that is, the corporation may be
a real person or the corporation may be merely a collection
of individuals. Between these two extremes any number of
views is possible, each being as a rule, a modification of the
one or the other. Thus the corporation may be regarded as
a fictitious being, an ancient doctrine. Or corporate holding
may be regarded as a form of collective property. Or, cor-
porate action may be regarded as the act of a representative
majority-that is to say, it is a peculiar form of agency.
It is to be remembered that we are in search of a
formula to express an artificial creature, through which
more and more of the world's affairs seek accomplish-
ment. The meaning of the name chosen is not a mat-
ter of indifference. If an act amounting to crime be
effected in the guise of corporate action, the fact that a non-
consenting minority has acted by representation, though in
the specific case unwillingly, makes all participants in a
delict, and the innocent share the guilt. But if we are
dealing with a real person, the collection of all the wills
of the body, to it must be attributed the guilt of the delict,
while those who execute the crime, are particeps criminis.
For criminal acts byond the sphere of corporate action, of
course, only those committing the acts could, in any case be
held answerable.
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The terms persona ficta, juristic person, or personne
morale are the terms most generally employed to designate
the organization through which corporate action is effected.
Those which exist for the purpose of administering govern-
mental powers are known as public corporations. Those
which are conducted for the purpose of enriching private
individuals are known as private corporations. For the
purposes of the present inquiry the distinction is not import-
ant, our problem being to determine the nature of the per-
son, being, or group, through which the will of the collec-
tion of members of the corporation finds expression.
It can scarcely be an exaggeration to lay half of the litiga-
tion with which our courts are filled, at the door of corpora-
tions. And the business of the world is absorbed by cor-
porations in a corresponding proportion. That the status
of such a creature, person, or collection of individuals cannot
long remain undefined, is not matter for argument. A cor-
poration cannot be for one purpose, so many men, for an-
other purpose a person, and for another purpose, a fiction.
As an individual, real or feigned, it must pay its debts; as a
holder of certain rights, it, as a whole, as an individual, must
be able to vindicate those rights; as the organizer of con-
certed efforts that result at times in violation of the law,
it must in some way be amenable to the criminal as well
as the civil law. Before we can deal with the collective
body, either as a subject of law, that is, as a definite holder
of rights, as a party to transactions, or as an object of law,
that is, something for whose benefit laws may be passed,
upon which benefits may be conferred, or against which
prohibitions may be directed, it is necessary to decide
whether this collective body is or is not a person. For the
corporation must for certain purposes be taken as a unit.
Whether it is a demand of convenience, or whether it arises
from the necessity of assuring the group an existence longer
than that of human life, the name by which the corporation
or state is known stands for a unit of some kind. The de-
mand of convenience exists in the case of an enormous rail-
road corporation, the stockholders of which are scattered
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throughout the countries of civilization. And the unit
known as the X railroad company, whether personified or
not, connotes wealth, aggressiveness, power and whatever
other attributes are conjured up by the bare mention of the
name. The necessity for perpetual existence compels per-
sonification of the state, to designate the mind of an entire
people in action. A kind of personification, hence, is inev-
itable, if it go no farther than the identification of a certain
group with a name.
The Persona Ficta. Let us suppose the necessity of per-
sonification admitted, but keep in mind clearly that the per-
sonification is objective-that it proceeds from without.
Subjectively-intrinsically-no person exists, but since we
desire to deal with the corporation as an individual, we shall
find it convenient. It is unreal, yet there may be a corpora-
tion though it have no members left. Its members may
change without change in the corporation. "If it is allowable
to illustrate one fiction by another," remarks a celebrated
author, "we may say that the artificial person is a fictitious
substance conceived as supporting legal attributes." 2 If age
were surety for worth, the fiction has age for its sponsor.
The conception of the persona ficta is an inheritance from
the Roman Law, developed and expanded by the ecclesias-
tical lawyers of the Middle Ages, and bestowed on modern
legal thought by Savigny. Real men are united to form a
fictitious being; a fiction which holds property. It has neces-
sarily, no natural rights. The theory hence, has no regard
for members; nor can the persona ficta exist except by virtue
of some creative act of the state.
All of the sophistry of the Middle Ages was insufficient to
maintain the proposition that a fiction could own property;
could absorb rights at the grant of the state, could occupy a
definite position in the community, a position unequivocally
different from that of its members; could by name sue and
be sued; could recover property in which the right of no
member could be identified.
'Pollock, Contract, Sixth Edition, p. iog.
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Men who did their own legal thinking broke loose from
the traditions of Roman law and looked at the corporation
anew. Upon one of them, a German, George Beseler by
name, there dawned the fact that he was regarding not a
fictitious, but a real being.3 He dared to contradict Savigny,
to criticise him, and to set up an analysis of the conception
of the corporation as a personality based not on Roman,
but on a priori principles. The spectral persona ficta showed
then what manner of man he was. He appeared full
panoplied for war, and heaped ridicule and contumely on
the usurper-the fiction called the juristic person, a myth.
But Beseler 4 and Gierke, his disciple, had attacked their
problem with an equipment of. mentality and erudition 5
that would not be denied and their labors had this for its
achievement, that the persona ficta was banished from the
German Civil Code, and the juristic person took its place as
a member of the legal family. For a shadowy fiction, never
supported by adequate analysis, never justified upon any
;Tou..d strongei thai, that of cunveiAence, they subsatuted
a theory, scientifically developed, practical, and susceptible
of some moral interpretation. Its principles were these.
The Juristic Person.-A right is inconceivable without
corresponding relations between some individual and the
community to which he is subject. If we find a right, such
as that of ownership, in existence, we must discover a sub-
ject for that right. If the right attach to a human being,
he is the subject; if it attach to a name used to designate
the collective will of a group of men, the name or collective
will is the subject. By advanced abstractions, by reasoning
a priori, jurists have reached the conclusion, that in rela-
tion to the quality of being a subject of law, the individual,
and the group of individuals as such, occupy a like posi-
tion. Personality is considered therefore, an attribute not
only of men, but of groups of men, acting as a unit for the
'Gierke, Genossenschaftstheorie, Einleitung, i.
"George Beselir, Volksrecht und Juristenrecht (1893), pp. i58, et.
seq.; System des Deutschen Privatrechts, vol. i, sec. 66, et seq.
" Gierke, Genossenschaftstheorie.
THE JUISTIC PERSON
attainment of a common end. This person, which is not a
human being, is called technically, a juristic person, a per-
somne morale to distinguish it from the physical personality
of mankind.
The term juristic person is simply the legal expression for
this fact, that above the individual or specific human exist-
ence there stands generic human existence. In other words,
when we encounter the problem of defining, interpreting,
explaining, the actions of human beings in groups, as such,
as contrasted with the action of any members of the group
as individuals, the group stands for genus, and the in-
dividual stands for species.
The collective will of a group of men so acting and
holding property, when recognized as a subject of law, or as
having legal subjectivity, or more plainly, when recognized
as capable of holding definite legal rights, is no more a
fiction than is the personality of any human being. -
This juristic person, or collective will of the group, is
not a creation of the law; the law does not create its per-
sonality, but finding a group engaged in some common
pursuit, endows it with a definite legal capacity. It is capa-
ble of exercising rights, capable of committing wrongs; the
former, it may vindicate; the latter it must atone for.
It may seem a far cry from the question of the legality of
a fine imposed upon a corporation in an amount greater than
that of its capital stock, to the apparently academic discus-
sion of its personality or non-personality, yet they are in
fact so intimately related that our legal system cannot
ignore the relation without affecting its stability. If men
as individuals can do acts that require intent, and men acting
in groups cannot. the community must restrict the activity
of men in groups.
Accordingly continental legal systems have met the prob-
'It must be understood, that for convenience in reasoning of legal
relations, the German jurists view rights, subjectively and objectively.
The person in whom a right inheres, is the subject of the right; but
the person toward whom a right is directed is the object of the right,
for example, the beneficiary of a trust. Again, viewing a right sub-
jectively and objectively-the owner is the subject of the right, viz.,
ownership; the property is the object of the right, viz., ownership.
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, Planck, vol. i, pp. go-i59, secs. 21-89.
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lem, and have adopted the juristic person as a full-fledged
and useful member of s ciety, albeit with some coyness
respecting the nature of its personality. Thus, the German
Civil Code devotes an entire title to juristic persons, but
in Planck's edition it is very judiciously observed, "the status
of a juristic person is independent of the presence of a
will power. The Burgerliches Gesetzbuch does not express
itself concerning the juristic construction of juristic per-
sonality; it speaks of associations and guilds having legal
capacity, without defining them further." The Spanish code
defines juristic persons as, I. "Corporations, associations
and organizations of a public nature recognized by the law.
Their personality begins from the very instant in which
they have been formally established in accordance with the
provisions of the law. 2. Associations of a private nature,
whether civil, mercantile or industrial, to which the law
concedes personality independent of that of each of the
associates."
'8
The appearance of the juristic person as a member of
legal society has not been accepted by all writers as an un-
mixed blessing. "This subject," says Planiol, 9 "which,
thirty years ago, languished in abject poverty, has become
an inexhaustible theme of controversy. German industry
has had for its achievement to toss into chaos this elemen-
tary principle; there are two ways in which men may hold
property-individually and collectively." 10
C6digo Civil, Lib. I, Tit. II, secs. 35-39.
'Planiol, Droit Civil, Tome I, Quatriime Edition, p. 973, sec. 3014.
"'In English the literature of the juristic person is confined to
monographs and magazine articles, and these very few in number.
They are: Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations; Maitland, In-
troduction to Political Theories of the Middle Age, a translation from
Gierke; Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, Journal
of Comparative Legislation, vol. 14, p. 192, 3.
The principal French works are: Vauthier, Etude sur les personnes
morales Duguit, L'Etat, le droit objectif et la loi positive, 2 vols.
1901-1903; Jusserand, Essai sur la propriet6 collective; Vareilles
Sommi~rse, Les personnes morales. The most important thesis is
that of Mr. Negulesco, Paris, igoo; see also Mestre, les personnes
morales et la probl~me le leur responsibilit6 penale.
The principal German works are Brinz, Pandekten, edition of 1888,
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The secret of personality, viewing the corporation as a
form of collective property, is contained in the possession
or absence of property. Thus, in France, the state is the
largest form of collective holding; its property is the na-
tional domain, and the various properties, public buildings
and the like which it acquires; and it is recognized in all
countries as a person. The next personified division of
government is the department, which likewise holds prop-
erty; next communes and syndicates of communes; then
sections of communes, in all, five superposed categories of
juristic persons, which represent distinct masses of collective
riches, of local, governmental, and national significance.
All of these, either by common consent or by virtue of legis-
lation, are regarded by the law as persons."
When we reach the canton and the arrondissement, we
cease to have persons; they are not invested with personality,
and there are no funds, no resources subject to their con-
trol; they have no patrimony. It is a question, therefore,
not of personality, but of patrimony. Where there is prop-
erty, there is personality. Where there is no property, there
is no personality.
1 2
Thus much for the holding of property. For the actions
of groups of men, collective actions, there is no reason, no
justification, no authority but that of might. Beginning
with the state, and proceeding downward to private corpor-
ations, control proceeds from the power of the strong over
the weak.
"Human groups," says Duguit, in his dramatic way,
1 3
"based upon community of needs, upon diversity of in-
dividual aptit-des, upon the reciprocity of services rendered;
sec. 432, et se. ; Zitelmann, Begriff und Wesen der so genannten
Juristischen Personen, Gierke Die Genossenschaftstheorie und die
deutsche Rechtsprechung, Beseler, Volksrecht und Juristarecht (1843),
pp. 158, et seq.: System des Deutschen Privatrechts, vol. I, sec. 66,
et seq.; Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht (i895).
'Planiol, op. cit., p. 978, sec. 3o23; Loi du 22 Mars, I89O, art. 170;
at i.
=Planiol, op. cit., p. 979, sec. 3024.
=Duguit, L'Etat, vol. 1, p. 15.
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in these human groups, some individuals stronger than
others, whether because they are better armed, or because
we recognize in them some supernatural power; whether
because they are richer, or because they are more numerous,
and who, thanks to this superior power, can impose their
will on others; these are the facts. Let us call the state a
human group, settled upon a definite territory, where the
stronger compel obedience of the weaker, and we are agreed.
Call political sovereignty that power which the stronger
exert over the weaker, there is no controversy. Proceed
beyond this and we enter the realm of hypothesis. To say
that this will of those who rule is only imposed upon in-
dividuals because it is the collective will, is a fiction con-
ceived to justify the power of the strong-a fiction, ingeni-
ous enough, invented by the prophets of force to legitimate
force, but for nothing else."
The existence of so prolonged a debate, upon a problem
of so many varied solutions, in itself indicates a lively
interest in the results to be obtained from a solution that
will bear analysis. For the ordinary transactions of com-
merce, there are no problems, and no solution is needed. It
may be that for the purpose of buying and selling the rights
of parties may be conserved by saying that "collective prop-
erty is buying from individual property. But when collect-
ive property has paralyzed the wheels of industry; when it
has loomed up as a blind, insatiable monster, soulless and
conscienceless, a fund, with the absorptive powers of some
pre-historic sponge; when, in short, collective property di-
rects what we shall pay for transportation, the quality of
food, the length of our working day, and regulates human
life to a daily increasing extent, we cannot dismiss responsi-
bility for its acts, when they threaten at times the well-being
of the community with the airy phrase, collective property.
For there are good collective properties and bad collective
properties; good fictions and bad fictions; good genera and
good species; good juristic persons and bad ones. Even
when torts are committed, the English law and the American
law have a resource in civil responsibility-in the liability of
THE JURISTIC PERSON
a master for the acts of his servant. But where an act is
committed for which an individual might be held liable
criminally, the law stops with the observation that the cor-
poration can be guilty neither of fraud nor of crime. Not-
withstanding, the crime or the fraud may have been com-
mitted and the corporation may have reaped the profit.
Returning for a moment to the state, which is everywhere
recognized as a person, it has been observed truly, that the
feeling that even the state is a very unreal person, may not
readily be dispelled. 14 But the difficulty is purely subjective;
the existence of personality apart from a body is insuf-
ficiently concrete. Yet the notions of ownership, or of in-
corporeal rights are equally esoteric. And if personality
offer a solution, the difficulty of the conception ought not
to stand in the way.
If now, we attempt to define our problem we shall find
the facts to be these.
Corporations, under existing legal systems, for judicial or
legislative purposes are regarded in two ways:
I. The corporation is a fictitious person or entity (as in
England and the United States).
II. The corporation is a real person (as in Germany,
France, Spain, and some other continental countries).
The problems arising under both of these attitudes are
these:
A. Does the corporation as a group or unit possess rights
and owe duties?
B. Has the corporation as a group or unit criminal or
moral responsibility?
C. What is the nature of the shareholders' interest?
If again, we examine the nature of corporate existence
with reference to proffered solutions, we shall find again,
that the corporation is a fictitious person, or a real person, or
a form of co-ownership, or a form of agency or action by
representation. It remains to consider these views with
reference to the extent to which they resolve the problem.
George F. Deiser.
_ F
"Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, lib. cit., p.
i96.
